You are here: Home / Archives for china

Abstract: Impacts of Social Media on the Chinese Governance

February 28, 2013 by Leave a Comment

In 2008, China surpassed the U.S – not in economic size or military spending – in how many people are online. In 2011, there were 565 million English internet users, compared to 510 million Chinese users. Just like in many other countries, Internet has changed the lives Chinese people. Among Chinese web users, it has been estimated about 210 million are online shoppers. Also the Internet has also become a major source of entertainment, accelerated by mobile phone access.

 

But unlike many other countries, Internet has become an important channel for the Chinese public to air their grievances. Exposures of corruptions and other government misconducts easily find their ways to the public through Weibo (microblog). Social media alleviates collective action problem and makes it easier for the discontented to organize and receive public attention. Topics of public concerns have been enthusiastically discussed on the Internet, creating a virtual “public sphere” in China. Participation has developed to such a degree that a common “netizen” can write a “weibo” (like a “tweet”) about a corrupt official where he lives. This can lead to the corrupt official losing their office after millions of people share the “tweet.” Professor Guobin Yang of Columbia University calls these internet-related struggles “online activism” in his book The Power of the Internet in China. “Net opinions,” opinions present on the Internet, become an important kind of political participation while more direct participations and criticisms of the government (such as protests and demonstrations) are less viable. The Internet has apparently challenged current mode of governance in China.

 

During the critical time when the new Chinese leadership is coming on the stage: the expectation of change is high. Optimists believe the Internet and social media will lead to Western style democratization in China. Pessimists worry that exuberant online activism will force the government to take a reactionary stance to the disastrous Cultural Revolution’s style of governance. “Realistic” observers take a middle path pointing out that the Chinese government still control public opinions and expressions; moreover, the internet to some extent is utilized by government as a tool to centralize and control information. On the one hand, the government shows its benignity by being responsive to public criticisms and endorsing some degree of Internet activism. On the other hand, China has been grouped by Freedom House with Iran and Cuba as the three countries of lowest degree of internet freedom. The main reason why a “Jasmine Revolution” did not take place in China is to a very large extent due to government’s efficient control over the Internet. The ongoing contention between “more liberty” and “tighter control” is shaping the future of governance in China.

 

In this project, I want to explore the impacts of social media on governance in China. Questions I hope to answer by the end of the project are concerned with three keywords: popular participation, challenge, official reaction.

 

Popular participation: to what extent do social media outlets such as Weibo facilitate and stimulate Chinese participation in public affairs? What is involved in “popular participation” (for example, as a channel to air grievances and articulations of interest)? How meaningful is the increase of popular participation to the current governance? Does increased participation create a Habermasian “public sphere” in China? What does popular participation tell us about modern Chinese attitudes towards “government” (i.e. where does government’s legitimacy come from?) and “a good government” (i.e. how Chinese people evaluate the government)? Is legitimacy of the party-government questioned by public expressions? Finally, how possible is China going to democratize?

 

Challenge: In what ways are social media used to challenge (or improve) governance? How effective are they? What are the political aspirations behind net opinions? How do social media alleviate collective action problems in China?

 

Official reaction: How does the central government cope with the new dynamism of civil participation facilitated by the Internet? Is censorship efficient enough to control public opinions? What does the public think of government censorship? Is it more likely that social media lead to a crisis of current governance or an opportunity of reform?

 

Because of the massive amount of informationon the internet, it is impossible for me in this project to make a comprehensive survey on all the popular websites in China. In fact, I will spend my first week compiling a list of websites as well as the time period I want to cover. My selective criterion will base on their relevance to the questions I intend to answer in this project. For example, domestic affairs will receive more concerns than foreign policy because the former reflects more truths about the current governance of the CCP. Next, I will evaluate relevant literature in Chinese and the English world, for the purpose of offering a theoretic background/context for this project before I offer my own findings. Finally, I will look carefully at the chosen websites and give my own observation of the impacts of social media on the Chinese governance.

 

Impacts of social media are tangible where internet is available. In democratic states, social media influence the way electoral campaign is conducted. In authoritarian states, social media create many new difficulties for government control. As we have already seen in the Arab Spring, social media accelerated the demise of authoritarian regimes and the process of democratization. China as one of the most persistent (and biggest) authoritarian states in the world is also being challenged by the new media. How the new Chinese leadership react to the challenge is a topic of immense interest.

Filed Under: Monroe 2013 Tagged With: , , ,

Final Overview

August 30, 2011 by

Now that I’m finished with my research paper, I can say that I’m pretty happy with what I was able to accomplish over the summer. My project started off a bit broad, but I was able to narrow it down and get going on something that I find extremely interesting and didn’t know much about when I started up. I’m pretty sure that I’m going to continue working with this project in one way or another — maybe in a course or independent study, or even as a larger project if I ever get to grad school. From what I’ve seen, there is certainly a lot to still be investigated looking at south-south partnerships within a relationship marketing framework and cultural policy in developing countries, in general.

This summer I was able to do and see a ton of things that are new to me. I completed a large panel data analysis that yielded results that fell in line with my theory. I also made it to Brazil and was able to speak with people that helped move my project along in the right direction (and got blown off by others). Here are the conclusions I drew from the research project:

Through an econometric panel data analysis and a case study of the Brazil-China partnership, this paper has offered evidence to support the theory that cultural ties precede and foster growth in economic relations in developing country partnerships. Countries, like businesses, have realized the increasing costs of the old transaction model of marketing and have instead sought to construct mutually beneficial long-term relationships. In the framework of relationship marketing and commitment-trust theory, shared values, manifested in culture, act as a precursor to the development of relationship commitment and trust. Developing countries, lacking the cultural market share of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, have used a variety of cultural policies to make up for the difference. In the burgeoning Brazil-China relationship, China has realized that its cultural distance has the potential to hinder future growth and has embarked on a number of missions to assuage Brazilian fears of neo-colonialism by sponsoring Confucius Institutes and other programs.

The econometric panel data analysis paired five emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa) with developing country partners and used a gravity model to test the relationship between bilateral exports of creative goods and bilateral merchandise exports. The analysis found a statistically and economically significant relationship, in which a 10% increase in creative exports related to a 1.09% increase in merchandise exports, or, using the sample averages, a $1 increase in creative exports related to a $3.56 increase in merchandise exports. While the analysis cannot prove a causal relationship, it offers evidence to support the theory that cultural ties precede and promote growth in economic ones in developing country partnerships. If data in FDI flows between developing countries becomes available, it could provide even more convincing support for the theory. The brief discussion of cultural policy instruments should also be further investigated as a legitimate tool for constructing long-term committed relationships and working toward the broader goal of development.

Filed Under: Monroe 2011 Tagged With: , , , ,

Brazil-China case study

August 27, 2011 by

Along with the quantitative section of the paper, I wanted to include a case study of Brazil’s relationship with China. Latin America (esp. Brazil) has always been my main regional interest in IR and economics and China’s presence has really shaken things up.

The Brazil-China economic relationship has boomed over the past decade and in 2009 China surpassed the US as Brazil’s largest trading partner. From 2009 to 2010, China’s FDI inflows to Brazil increased from $300 million to $17 billion, more than a third of the total flow in to Brazil. Questions, though, have arisen from the Brazilian side on how beneficial its relationship will prove to be. Brazil fears the impact of Chinese companies dumping manufactured goods on its domestic manufacturers and that the relationship depends far too much on it exporting commodities and raw materials, which could lead to de-industrialization. Many have claimed that Brazil’s dependence on commodity exports to China looks like neo-colonialism. The cultural distance between the partners also does not help.

On its face, the Brazil-China relationship is marked by some of the most common, static indicators of distance, such as language (with the exception of the now independent Macau region), religion, and geographical distance. Aside from Brazil importing a few thousand Chinese workers to take over for emancipated slaves in the late 1800s and more recent migrations, the countries had little to no interaction, economic or political, for much of the past few centuries. China, today, also has a reputation for autocracy and poor environmental, human rights, and labor practices, which all fall in striking contrast to the image Brazil has constructed of itself since the end of the military dictatorship.

These frictions have played out on the macro and micro level, with both the Brazilian government and individuals sometimes showing that they are wary of China’s power. For example, the Brazilian government has brought a number of cases to the World Trade Organization against China for suspected dumping and it has also criticized China’s valuation of the yuan. In the workplace, Brazilian organizational and business culture often conflicts with the model Chinese companies bring to Brazil. Chinese companies function with a strong amount of centralization, that puts little trust in local managers and has a bad reputation toward labor rights. Generally, Chinese companies hire Chinese workers to avoid cultural tensions, but Brazilian officials push foreign companies to employ local workers. Brazil’s strong labor protections, bureaucratic red tape for businesses, and what is viewed as a “lax” and “informal” attitude toward work in comparison to the Chinese are among the many common issues, while “a survey of 500 Brazilian executives working for Chinese, North American and European companies… found that 42 percent of Brazilian executives working for Chinese companies left their jobs within a year, a 68 percent higher turnover rate than found in the other firms studied” (Brooks 2011).

China has attempted to alleviate these fears through a few avenues. They have recently opened two Confucius Institutes — one in Brasilia and one in São Paulo — which offer language courses and sponsor a variety cultural programs. Confucius Institutes exist all over the world (and apparently W&M is getting one now, too) and function as a university partnership program, with an exchange of faculty and students. There also are business development organizations, such as the Brazil-China Chamber of Economic Development (CBCDE) that offer services to help mitigate the distance between the two countries.

I’m wary of using the term ‘soft power’ since that just opens up a whole new theoretical mess, but Chinese programs like Confucius Institutes would probably fall into the category of China attempting to project its soft power into Latin America. I’m more comfortable with employing the model of relationship marketing here, than trying to fit the Brazil-China relationship into a realist paradigm.

Filed Under: Monroe 2011 Tagged With: , , , ,
«Older Posts